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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal presents the following issues for review. 
Issue #1: Whether any of the lower court's factual findings were "clearly 
erroneous"? 
Standard of Review: The lower court's factual findings, "whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . . " Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). "After marshaling all the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling, an 
appellant must demonstrate that even in the light most favorable to the trial court, the 
evidence was insufficient to support the findings." Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 
1178-79 (Utah 1989). To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, 
"an appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" 
Issue #2: Given the factual findings made by the lower court, did the lower court 
err in finding that CDLF had not met its burden of establishing the existence of a separate 
oral contract to convey real property by clear, convincing and definite evidence? 
Standard of Review: "The applicability of the statute of frauds is a question of 
law to be reviewed for correctness. However, because a trial court must consider facts 
offered by the parties regarding part performance of the agreement, we follow the above-
289041 1 
articulated standard of review for these subsidiary factual determinations and will reverse 
only '"[i]f the evidence is so vague and uncertain that the finding is obviously 
erroneous."5" Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, \ 23, 44 P.3d 742 (quoting Martin v. Scholl, 
678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983)) (quoting Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 
18, 23, 305 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah 1956).). 
Issue #3: Given the factual findings made by the lower court, did the lower court 
err in finding that CDLF had not met its burden of establishing that its alleged part 
performance was clear, definite and exclusively referable to the alleged oral contract to 
convey real property? 
Standard of Review: See Standard of Review for Issue #2, above. 
Issue #4: Given the factual findings made by the lower court, did the lower court 
err in finding that CDLF had not met its burden of establishing that it was entitled to a 
preliminary injunction? 
Standard of Review: "Where a court's ruling on a motion for an injunction is 
based on its consideration of the evidence presented in light of relevant legal factors, the 
grant or denial of injunctive relief rests within the discretion of the trial court." [Citations 
omitted.] The court's construction of an applicable legal standard, however, is reviewed 
for correctness; we afford no deference to the court's interpretations of law." [Citations 
omitted.] Hunsaker v. Kersh, 1999 UT 106, t 6, 991 P.2d 67. 
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STATUTES AND RULES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Findings by the court - Effect. 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant 
to Rule 58 A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the 
court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings 
are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings 
of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded 
in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an 
opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial 
court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court 
shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, 
and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Injunctions - Grounds. 
A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a 
showing by the applicant that: 
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or 
injunction issues; 
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage 
the proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or 
enjoined; 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public 
interest; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the 
merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on 
the merits which should be the subject of further litigation. 
289041J 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case presents a dispute over the scope of a gift made to a charitable 
organization, Appellant Centro de la Familia de Utah ("CDLF") by Appellees Dream 
Chaser, L.L.C. ("Dream Chaser") and Bonita Carter, individually and in her capacity as 
Trustee of The Carter Family Foundation ("Carter" or collectively "Carters"). The 
Carters intended to give CDLF a lease for a two year term, with options to renew for ten 
year terms, to the Honeyville Elementary School (the "Property"). This gift was based 
upon written documents. CDLF claims it was entitled to receive title to the Property 
based on an oral agreement. 
Statement of Facts 
Rule 52(a) mandates that "in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the 
court shal l . . . set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). These findings, "whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . ." Id. As 
explained in more detail below, CDLF incorrectly asserts that it can avoid the marshaling 
requirement of Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) and have this Court exercise de novo review 
over factual findings simply because the lower court did not hear live testimony. 
Because the lower court's findings of fact are given deferential review under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a), there is no reason to disturb them where the appellant fails to marshal 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings. Grayson Roper Ltd. P 'ship v. Finlinson, 
782 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah 1989). 
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The lower court's findings are attached to Appellant Add. as Ex. L and 
incorporated by Carters in their entirety. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court's decision to deny CDLF's motion for preliminary injunction, 
although based solely on documentary evidence, does not merit a de novo review. 
Instead, the lower court's findings of fact may be set aside only if clearly erroneous. 
Under the clearly erroneous standard of review, the lower court's findings of fact are 
presumed correct. In addition, because CDLF failed to fulfill its obligation to marshal the 
evidence in support of the lower court's factual findings, the lower court's findings are 
presumed correct. 
Even if CDLF had marshaled all of the evidence supporting the lower court's 
findings, the lower court's denial of preliminary injunction should not be overturned 
because CDLF has failed to show that the clear weight of the evidence supports a finding 
that it has met all the elements of a preliminary injunction. CDLF has failed to show that 
it is likely to succeed on the merits of their underlying claim. They have not presented 
evidence which clearly supports a finding of a firm commitment by the Carters to transfer 
the Property to CDLF. In addition, CDLF has failed to show that the evidence supports a 
finding of part performance sufficient to either avoid the statute of frauds or supply a 
substitution for consideration. CDLF has also failed to adequately establish the element 
of irreparable harm. The trial court's decision to deny CDLF's motion for preliminary 
injunction should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. CDLF HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL 
FINDINGS WERE "CLEARLY ERRONEOUS", 
CDLF asserts that it can avoid the marshaling requirement of Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9) and asks this Court to exercise de novo review over factual findings, simply 
because the lower court did not hear live testimony. Appellant's Brief at 23-24. CDLF is 
incorrect on both issues. 
A. Appellate Courts Do Not Review Evidence De Novo. 
Rule 52(a) mandates that "in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the 
court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute 
the grounds of its action." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). These findings, "whether based on oral 
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . ." Id. Only 
if a trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "'against the clear weight of 
the evidence'" are they clearly erroneous. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 
(Utah 1998) (quoting In re Estate ofBartch, 116 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989).). 
Where, as here, the lower court has denied a motion for preliminary injunction, to 
successfully argue that the trial court erred in denying the preliminary injunction, CDLF: 
[M]ust successfully challenge all of the findings regarding [its] 
inability to meet the essential elements. In other words, [CDLF] 
must show that the clear weight of the evidence supports a finding 
that it has met all the elements of a preliminary injunction. 
Utah Med Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah 1998). 
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CDLF asserts that it can avoid the marshaling requirement, and have this Court 
exercise de novo review over factual findings, simply because the lower court did not 
hear live testimony.1 Appellant's Brief at 23-24. 
CDLF's contention was rejected with the 1987 addition of the "oral or 
documentary evidence" language to Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), adopting the 1985 amendment 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). 105 F.R.D. 179, 221 (1985). The Advisory Committee Notes to 
the 1985 amendment of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) explicitly rejected the position taken by 
CDLF. The same argument had been made by several courts of appeal under the 
pre-1985 version of Rule 52(a). 105 F.R.D. at 221-23. They, too, had argued that when a 
trial court's findings did not rest on the observation of a witness' demeanor, there was no 
need to defer to the trial court's findings. Id. Rejecting this position, the Advisory 
Committee stated: 
The principal argument advanced in favor of a more searching 
appellate review of findings by the district court based solely on 
documentary evidence is that the rationale of Rule 52(a) does not 
apply when the findings do not rest on the trial court's assessment of 
credibility of the witnesses but on an evaluation of documentary 
proof and the drawing of inferences from it, thus eliminating the 
need for any special deference to the trial court's findings. These 
considerations are outweighed by the public interest in the stability 
and judicial economy that would be promoted by recognizing that 
the trial court, not the appellate tribunal, should be the finder of the 
facts. To permit courts of appeals to share more actively in the fact-
finding function would tend to undermine the legitimacy of the 
district courts in the eyes of litigants, multiply appeals by 
Relying upon this assertion, CDLF fails to make even the slightest attempt to 
fulfill its obligation to marshal the evidence in support of the lower court's factual 
findings. Rather, CDLF presents only evidence favorable to its case, ignoring evidence 
supportive of the trial court's findings. 
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encouraging appellate retrial of some factual issues, and needlessly 
reallocate judicial authority. 
105 F.R.D. at 222-23. 
This Court has "recognize[d] the persuasiveness of federal interpretations when 
the state and federal rules are similar and few Utah cases deal with the rule in question." 
Barton v. Utah Transit Auth., 872 P.2d 1036, 1039 n.5 (Utah 1994). Shortly after Utah's 
version of Rule 52(a) was amended to adopt the federal rule's "oral or documentary 
evidence" language, this Court specifically "disavowed] language in our earlier cases 
describing or implying a standard under new Rule 52(a) which differs in any significant 
respect from the standard of review [set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)]." 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
Just before the 1985 amendment, the United States Supreme Court had instructed 
that the "clearly erroneous" standard in the federal rule required that "appellate courts 
must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo." 
Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969)). The Court went on to note: 
This is so even when the district court's findings do not rest on 
credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or 
documentary evidence or inferences from other facts. 
The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not 
limited to the superiority of the trial judge's position to make 
2
 The 1985 amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) was published on April 29, 1985 
and became effective on August 1, 1985. 105 F.R.D. at 202. Anderson v. City of 
Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), was decided on March 19, 1985. 
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determinations of credibility. The trial judge's major role is the 
determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role 
comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge's efforts in the court 
of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the 
accuracy of fact determinations at a huge cost in diversion of judicial 
resources. 
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574-75. See Walker, 743 P.2d at 193 ("The appellate court . . . 
does not consider and weigh the evidence de novo. The mere fact that on the same 
evidence the appellate court might have reached a different result does not justify it in 
setting the findings aside.'") (quoting 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971) (citations omitted)). 
B. CDLF Is Not Excused From Marshaling Evidence in Support of the 
Lower Court's Findings, 
Relying upon the fact that the lower court did not hear live testimony, CDLF fails 
to make even the slightest attempt to fulfill its obligation to marshal the evidence in 
support of the lower court's factual findings.3 Rather, CDLF presents only evidence 
favorable to its case, ignoring evidence supportive of the trial court's findings. 
3
 In West Valley City v. Majestic Inv., Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), it was noted: 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. 
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of 
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing 
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out 
a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to 
convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon 
the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
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Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that "[a] party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." Utah case law echoes this prerequisite: 
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, 
"an appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings 
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight 
of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" 
Utah Med. Prods., 958 P.2d at 232 (quoting Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312) (quoting In re 
Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)) (quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193). 
"After marshaling all the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling, an appellant must 
demonstrate that even in the light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence was 
insufficient to support the findings." Utah Med. Prods., 958 P.2d at 232 (citing Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989)). 
CDLF's failure to marshal the evidence alone warrants affirmance of the lower 
court's decision because of the presumption of correctness that the findings are accorded 
under Rule 52(a). Utah Med. Prods., 958 P.2d at 232 ("If the challenger fails to meet this 
burden, its claim must fail."). See also Grayson Roper Ltd. P'ship v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 
467, 471 (Utah 1989) (holding that because a trial court's findings of fact are given such 
deferential review under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) there is no reason to disturb them where 
the appellant fails to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's findings); Doelle v. 
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989) (same). 
Because of CDLF's failure to marshal any evidence in support of the lower court's 
factual findings, this Court should affirm the lower court's decision. The record 
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adequately supports the findings of the lower court. The application of the lower court's 
conclusions of law to the facts as determined by the court were not addressed by CDLF in 
its Appellant's Brief and, thus, are not properly challenged here. 
C. The Lower Court's Findings Are Not Clearly Erroneous, 
Even if CDLF had marshaled all the evidence supporting the lower court's 
findings, it could not have demonstrated that the evidence was legally insufficient to 
support the findings. A trial court's factual findings are considered "clearly erroneous" 
only when they are against the clear weight of the evidence. Doelle, 784 P.2d at 1178 
(citing Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989)). "In sum, we 
will not overturn a trial court's factual findings if its 'account of the evidence is plausible 
in light of the record viewed in its entirety.'" Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 
932, 937 (Utah 1998) (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574). 
Each of the lower court's findings was supported by a citation to the documentary 
evidence upon which it was based. (R. 592-600.) CDLF was given an opportunity, and 
did file objections to the proposed findings. See PL's Objections to Def.s' Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 554-63.) Defendants Carter, the 
Foundation and Dream Chaser responded to CDLF's Objections, (R. 564-71), and 
submitted a modified set of findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 572-88) which the 
lower court adopted. (R. 589-90; 591-608.) 
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CDLF's failure to marshal evidence saves it the embarrassment of having to 
undermine one of its key factual and legal assertions4 with the affidavit of its own Chief 
Executive Officer, Graciela Italiano-Thomas. In her first affidavit, Ms. Thomas stated 
that "but for Ms. Carter's promise to convey the Property to CDLF, CDLF probably 
would not have located a Head Start Program [at the Honeyville School] because the Box 
Elder School District was unwilling to give it to CDLF, and it was unlikely we would 
be able to obtain separate funding to purchase the Property." March 6, 2003 
Affidavit of Graciela Italiano-Thomas ^ 5 (emphasis added). (R. 126.) Three weeks 
later, in a second affidavit,5 Ms. Thomas contradicted this testimony and asserted that 
"CDLF determined that in the event the School District Board was not prepared to give 
the Property to CDLF, then CDLF would attempt to purchase it for a suitable price using 
a portion of the $600,000 it had on hand . . . . " March 27, 2003 Affidavit of Graciela 
Italiano-Thomas % 3. (R. 467.) 
CDLF relies exclusively upon Ms. Thomas' second Affidavit, asserting that its 
consideration for the alleged oral agreement to convey title was its forbearance from 
attempting to purchase the Property with the money it allegedly had on hand, in reliance 
upon Ms. Carter's alleged promise. Appellant's Brief at 6 flf 5), 8 flflf 11 and 13), 36, 38 
and 40. 
5
 Although CDLF complains about the lack of discovery as part of some 
underhanded scheme by the Carters to prejudice CDLF, Appellant's Brief at 18 n.2, the 
lack of discovery has, obviously, effected both parties. See Hearing Transcript at 14-15 
(Appellant App. Ex. J). It was the defendants who were prejudiced by the late filing of 
CDLF's second set of affidavits - receiving them after business hours on the Friday 
before the hearing on Monday, March 31, 2003, leaving no opportunity to submit 
counter-affidavits or present contrary documentary evidence. Id. 
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The lower court expressly rejected the later inconsistent statement, concluding that 
"CDLF's own testimony brings into question whether there was any forbearance in June 
2000 based on CDLF's assertion it withdrew from attempting to locate some other 
property, or to purchase the Property using money it allegedly had on hand." 
Conclusions of Law 121. (R. 606.) See also Findings of Fact 1f 8 (R. 593).6 
CDLF cannot rely on an inconsistency it created in its own affidavits to argue that 
the lower court's finding was "clearly erroneous." Cf. Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. 
Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 71 (Utah 1998) ('"when a party takes a clear position in a 
deposition,... he may not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which 
contradicts his deposition, unless he can provide an explanation for the discrepancy.'") 
(quoting Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983)). 
D. CDLF Is Precluded From Complaining About the Lower Court's 
Refusal to Hear Live Testimony, 
Even though a trial court does not need to hold an evidentiary hearing and observe 
a witness' demeanor in order to receive the deference afforded by Rule 52(a), see 
CDLF did not object to paragraph 8 of the lower court's findings. Rather, it 
argued that the factual statement was "incomplete" because it did not include the 
contradictory statements in Ms. Thomas' second affidavit. (R. 555.) In addition, CDLF 
did not object to the legal conclusion of the lower court based upon that finding. 
(R. 559.) The court's finding was also supported by other evidence. Although a third 
party developer had made an offer to buy the Property in May 2000, Affidavit of Ronald 
L. Frandsen f 5 (R. 363), the School Board never received any inquiry or offer from 
CDLF concerning the purchase of the Property. Frandsen Aff. 115 (R. 365-66); Findings 
of Fact \ 9 (R. 593). In addition, Ms. Carter testified that Ms. Thomas never said 
anything to her which suggested that CDLF was going to withdraw from any attempt to 
independently acquire the Property in reliance upon Ms. Carter's statements. Affidavit of 
Bonita K. Carter f 9. (R. 282.) 
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Section A, above, CDLF complains that the absence of live testimony relieves it of its 
obligation to marshal evidence, Appellant's Brief at 23-24, and that it was prejudiced by 
the lower court's "refusal to hear live testimony" before denying the motion for 
preliminary injunction. Id. at 18 n.2. 
At the hearing on its Motion for Preliminary Injunction, CDLF never requested 
that the lower court either hear live testimony or allow it to proffer testimony on its 
witnesses' behalf, See Hearing Transcript (Appellant App. Ex. J). There was no request 
for the court to refuse. Id. "One who fails to make a necessary objection . . . is deemed 
to have waived the issue." Lamb v. B&B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 932 (Utah 
1993) (citing Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988)). CDLF should therefore 
be precluded from complaining that the lower court refused to hear live testimony. 
CDLF cannot raise its argument that the lower court refused and/or failed to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing for the first time on appeal. At the preliminary injunction 
hearing CDLF never raised any issue concerning the failure to hear live testimony. See 
Hearing Transcript (Appellant App. Ex. J). Although it filed objections to the proposed 
findings, CDLF did not raise the issue of the failure of the court to hear live testimony. 
See PL's Objections to Def.s' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
(R. 554-63.) 
This Court has consistently refused to consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal. See, e.g., Espinalv. Salt Lake City Bd ofEduc., 797 P.2d412, 413 (Utah 1990). 
As explained in Olson v. Parh-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah Ct. App. 1991): 
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"[t]he burden is on the parties to make certain that the record they 
compile will adequately preserve their arguments for review " 
Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 
1983). The role of the appellate court is to sift the parties' 
arguments in light of "the facts found by the trial court and square 
them with the law." State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296,1299 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). [The appellate court may], however, weigh only those 
facts and legal arguments preserved for [them] in the trial court 
record. Ringwoodv. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1358-
59 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
<9ta,815P.2dat l359. 
Nowhere in the record is there reflected a request by CDLF that the lower court 
either hear live testimony or allow them to proffer testimony on behalf of its witnesses. 
See Appellant App. Ex. J. Also nowhere in the record is there an objection by CDLF to 
the lower court's failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id.; PL's Objections to Def.s' 
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 554-63.) CDLF's 
argument that the court erred in denying their motion for preliminary injunction without 
holding an evidentiary hearing therefore cannot be considered by this Court. 
II. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT CDLF COULD NOT 
SATISFY THE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE GRANTING OF A 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. 
Because injunctive relief is "an extraordinary remedy," it "should not be lightly 
granted." System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983). CDLF has the 
burden to establish that it has satisfied all four of the required elements. Water & Energy 
Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 1999 UT 16,1f 7, 974 P.2d 821. Here, CDLF's right to relief is 
not sufficiently clear or unequivocal to warrant this Court granting the requested 
preliminary injunction. 
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CDLF acknowledges its obligation to make a prima facie showing of the elements 
of its underlying claim for breach of an oral contract. CDLF sets forth the correct legal 
standard: "[T]he terms of the oral contract [to convey title of land] must be clear and 
definite and established by clear and definite testimony." Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 
P.2d 74, 79 (Utah 1982) (citing Holmgren Bros., Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah 
1975)). Appellant's Brief at 30. 
A. There Is Not Clear and Definite Testimony of an Agreement by 
Carters to Convey Title to the Property, 
The facts as determined by the lower court demonstrate that the Carters never 
expressed a sufficient intent to be bound by the alleged oral contract to convey title to the 
Property to CDLF. At best, CDLF has presented evidence that there was nothing more 
than an unenforceable agreement to agree. 
In early June 2000, shortly after Ms. Carter learned that the Honeyville School 
was scheduled to be closed and the building sold, and that CDLF was interested in using 
the Property to house its Migrant Head Start program in Box Elder County, she met with 
Ms. Thomas. Finding of Fact fflf 11-12. (R. 593-94.) During the meeting they discussed 
an outright donation of title to the Property to CDLF, among other possibilities. Finding 
of Fact If 13. (R. 594.) While CDLF and its witnesses try to make Ms. Carters' 
statements sound like a firm commitment, Appellant's Statement of Facts fflj 8-10, 
Appellant's Brief at 7, it was easy for the lower court to see that they were not. 
First, Ms. Thomas' testimony of the first meeting between CDLF and Ms. Carter 
confirms that all that was "offered" by Ms. Carter was to meet again. Second Thomas 
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Affidavit 17 ("I enthusiastically accepted Mrs. Carter's offer to meet again ") 
(R. 468.) See Appellant's Statement of Facts If 11, Appellant's Brief at 8 ("Ms. Thomas 
enthusiastically accepted Mrs. Carter's offer to meet again to finalize plans to convey the 
Property."). 
That only a limited offer to meet again resulted from this first meeting was 
recognized in the contemporaneous letter Ms. Thomas sent to Ms. Carter following the 
meeting. It contained no reference to any promise by Ms. Carter to give the Property 
(which neither Ms. Carter nor Dream Chaser owned at the time) to CDLF. Nor did 
the letter reflect that a firm commitment had been made during the meeting by Ms. Carter 
to make an outright donation of title to the Property. The letter merely referred to an 
undefined "generous proposal" and acknowledged that there were "many details to work 
out." Appellant App. Ex. A (emphasis added). The lower court noted that "[rjather than 
a statement that CDLF and Bonnie Carter had entered into binding agreement, Ms. 
Italiano-Thomas states: T earnestly hope this donation can go forward.'" Finding of 
Fact 114, quoting Appellant App. Ex. A. (R. 594.) 
At this point in time, there was no definitive agreement because the parties 
intended to meet again to work out the details and finalize their plans to convey the 
Property. In Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride Stables, 224 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2000), 
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under even more compelling facts,7 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Utah 
law, determined that: 
If the parties intend to negotiate further the terms of an agreement, a 
manifestation of willingness to enter into the agreement is only 
preliminary, and does not demonstrate the existence of a binding 
contract. 
224 F.3d at 1200 (citation omitted). As in Homestead Golf Club, "[a]ll that the parties 
consummated . . . was an agreement to agree, which is 'unenforceable . . . . ' " 224 F.3d 
at 1201 (quoting Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979)). 
It is in this context, based upon what Ms. Thomas herself characterized as a mere 
"hope," that CDLF now asserts that it withdrew from any attempt to independently 
acquire the Property. Appellant's Statement of Facts f 13, Appellant's Brief at 8. 
Considered in context, even if viewed as an act of detrimental reliance, the lower court's 
conclusion that the reliance was not reasonable is supported by the facts. See Conclusion 
of Law 120. (R. 605-06.) See also Crismon v. Western Co. ofN. Am., 742 P.2d 1219, 
1223 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (upholding implicit finding it was not reasonable to rely on a 
In Homestead Golf Club, following the parties reaching their oral agreement and 
pending written documentation of the agreement, the party which sought to enforce the 
oral agreement signed a letter of commitment. 224 F.3d at 1198. In addition, written 
drafts of the final agreement and related documents were prepared and presented to that 
party, but not signed. Id. Finally, the party which sought to enforce the oral agreement 
relied on the fact that it had fully performed - allowing the golf course to be built on its 
land. Id. at 1202. 
8
 There are serious doubts as to whether CDLF could have independently acquired 
the Property. Ms. Thomas stated in her first affidavit that "it was unlikely we would be 
able to obtain separate funding to purchase the Property." First Thomas Aff. \ 5. 
(R. 126.) See Findings of Fact Tf 8. (R. 593.) 
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letter as a binding agreement; appellate court will defer to trial court's finding unless 
clearly erroneous or have no support). 
The next event which CDLF relies upon in support of the so-called oral 
agreement, occurred in July 2000. The Carters submitted an offer to the School District 
to buy the Property for $30,000, with the closing date set in early August 2000. Finding 
of Fact <| 16. (R. 595.) According to CDLF's affidavits, before this offer was rejected by 
the School District, the Carters met with representatives of CDLF. Again, CDLF claims 
there were statements made concerning the Carters' intent. Appellant's Statement of 
Facts f 14, Appellant's Brief at 8-9. However, these statements were, according to 
CDLF's own testimony, made on the assumption that the Carters would only have to pay 
$30,000 for the Property. Second Thomas Affidavit [^ 9. (R. 468.) The $30,000 offer 
was rejected by the School District. Finding of Fact f 18. (R. 595.) 
By the time the School District and the Carters agreed to the terms of a purchase 
of the Property in September 2000, several things had changed. The price of the Property 
had more than doubled - to $72,500. Finding of Fact fflj 20-21. (R. 595.) The School 
District and Carters had agreed the sale would be to Dream Chaser, an entity formed by 
the Carters specifically to own and manage the Property. (Id.) The School District was 
unable to provide marketable title to the South Parcel of the Property which was used, as 
a septic system drainage field. Finding of Fact *§ 19. (R. 595.) 
Significantly, by the time of the September 28, 2000 closing, the Carters decided 
that they would only lease the Property to CDLF rent free for a two year period. Finding 
of Fact f 23. (R. 596.) While CDLF assigns an alternative motive to the Carters for the 
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two year lease,9 there is no dispute that CDLF was advised of this change prior to the 
closing. Appellant's Statement of Facts«[[ 19, Appellant's Brief at 11. In addition, there 
is no dispute that CDLF agreed to and executed the Lease Agreement in December 2000. 
Finding of Fact f 30 (R. 597); Appellant's Brief at 34. This was done after several drafts 
of the Lease were exchanged between counsel for CDLF and counsel for Dream Chaser. 
Finding of Fact If 27 (R. 597); Appellant's Statement of Facts 1f 25, Appellant's Brief 
at 13. 
There is also no dispute10 that CDLF's counsel proposed that the lease be 
simultaneously executed with a pledge of the Property to CDLF. Finding of Fact 128. 
(R. 597.) This request for a pledge would have assured that title to the Property be 
conveyed to CDLF at some point in the future. The request was rejected by the Carters' 
counsel. Finding of Fact f 29. (R. 597.) This is further evidence supporting the lower 
CDLF asserts that the Lease Agreement was to cover the time until the 
improvements were completed so that the Carters could claim a tax deduction for the 
value of the Property after the improvements were made by CDLF - in essence 
misrepresenting the financial source of the improvements to the Internal Revenue 
Service. Appellant's Statement of Facts f 14, Appellant's Brief at 8-9. Needless to say, 
the Carters did not in fact perpetrate this fraud on the government (and claim they never 
intended to). Before the end of December 2000, the Carters transferred their interest in 
Dream Chaser to the Foundation, a non-profit corporation formed by the Carters. It was 
the transfer of this interest for which the Carters took a charitable deduction on their 
federal tax returns, not any transfer of any interest in the Property to CDLF or after 
improvements had been made. Finding of Fact f 31. (R. 597-98.) 
10
 CDLF's counsel, Mr. Scott W. Hansen, was aware of the Carters' factual assertion 
concerning the request for a pledge of the title when he submitted his second affidavit, 
see March 28, 2003 Affidavit of Scott W. Hansen \ 5 (R. 440-41), and never denied its 
truth. Id. (R. 439-443.) 
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court's conclusion that the Carters did not intend to convey title, once they had in fact 
obtained it. 
CDLF next relies upon vague statements purportedly made to a couple of 
newspapers by the Carters around the time of closing as the basis for an oral agreement to 
convey title to real property.11 Appellant's Statement of Facts f 18, Appellant's Brief 
at 11. See also Appellant's Brief at 32, 33, 42 and 43. The newspaper articles are 
inconclusive - and certainly not the "clear and definite testimony" CDLF acknowledges 
it needs to present. Appellant's Brief at 30. The September 30, 2000 Standard Examiner 
article, for example, quotes Ms. Thomas as acknowledging that no binding commitment 
had yet been made: "We are very appreciative that they are considering us for the 
gift . . . . " Appellant App. Ex. C (emphasis added). The newspaper articles also reflect 
the absence of a firm commitment by the Carters to transfer the Property and suggests the 
existence of what was even then a mere promise of future performance. Id. ("still 
working out" details); Appellant App. Ex. D ("plan on turning the property over") 
(emphasis added). 
The minutes of the September 27, 2000 School District Board meeting upon which 
CDLF also relies, Appellant's Statement of Facts f 17, Appellant's Brief at 10 and at 42-
43, merely state that the Carters intended to "gift the property . . . to [CDLF] for use in 
Relying on documents such as newspaper articles is problematic for CDLF. The 
Standard Examiner article can also be read as establishing that CDLF's purported 
consideration was lacking. Rather than mentioning an exchanged consideration to invest 
over $600,000 in the Property, the article states: "No major changes are planned for the 
building . . . . " Appellant App. Ex. C. 
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their program." Appellant App. Ex. B (emphasis added). This fact does not further 
CDLF's claim. The long-term lease commitment set forth in the March 23, 2001 letter, 
Appellant App. Ex. I, certainly qualifies as a gift of the "use" of the Property for CDLF's 
program. 
In any event, none of these "memorializations" relied upon by CDLF satisfy the 
statute of frauds. They were not subscribed to by the Carters, Dream Chaser or the 
Foundation, or an agent of those parties.12 See Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah 2d 291,495 
P.2d 814 (Utah 1972) (holding that meeting minutes did not satisfy the statute of frauds 
because there was nothing to indicate that they had been subscribed to by the party by 
whom the sale was to be made). 
CDLF's version of the "objective" facts do not reflect "the manifestation of 
willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding 
that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it." Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 24 (1981 ed.). (Relied upon at appellant's brief at 32.) The evidence more 
than adequately supports the lower court's conclusion that "[n]one of the statements of 
intent to convey the Property made by the Carters to representatives of CDLF occurred 
after the Carters, through Dream Chaser, had obtained title to the Property." Findings of 
Fact 125. (R. 596.) This finding, and the others made by the lower court, support its 
legal conclusion that the Carters never "expressed a sufficient intent to be bound by the 
Similarly, the 2000 Annual Report was prepared by CDLF and cannot support a 
finding that the Carters are bound to an oral agreement to convey title to the Property. 
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alleged oral contract to convey title to the Property to CDLF." Conclusion of Law f^ 5. 
(R.601.) 
B. CDLF Cannot Show Substantial Part Performance Exclusively 
Referable to the Alleged Oral Agreement, 
CDLF relies upon part performance of the alleged oral agreement for the Carters 
to convey title both to satisfy the requirement of consideration necessary to support the 
formation of a contract, and to avoid the statute of frauds. The evidence of part 
performance presented here is insufficient for both. 
There is no doubt that "[i]n a contract action in this state, consideration or a legally 
sufficient substitute for consideration must be established as part of plaintiff s prima facie 
case." Dementas v. Estate ofTallas, 164 P.2d 628, 632 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations 
omitted). Further, "the burden of proving consideration is on the party seeking to recover 
on the contract." Id. at 631 (citing Miller v. Miller, 664 P.2d 39, 40 (Wyo. 1983). 
CDLF first relies upon its rejected contention that in June 2000 it changed its 
position by withdrawing from attempting to purchase the Property. The factual basis for 
this alleged act of forbearance simply does not exist. The lower court's finding that 
"CDLF's own testimony brings into question whether there was any forbearance in June 
2000 based on CDLF's assertion it withdrew from attempting to locate some other 
The Appellants incorrectly state that "Carters do not dispute that CDLF satisfies 
three of the four elements of the part performance exception (i.e.9 the improvements made 
on the property were substantial and valuable; valuable consideration was given; and 
possession was actual and open)." Appellant's Brief at 2. Later in their brief, CDLF 
acknowledges that the Carters did challenge whether valuable consideration was given. 
M a t 36. 
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property, or to purchase the Property using money it allegedly had on hand", Conclusions 
of Law Tf 21 (R. 606), see also Findings of Fact f 8 (R. 593), is sufficiently supported by 
the record to avoid being overturned by this Court. 
CDLF next relies upon the retention of and payment to its architect. These acts 
cannot constitute adequate part performance for several reasons. First, the Carters were 
not aware of the retention of the architects or their payment. Thus, the Carters had no 
way to know prior to March 23, 2001 that CDLF was supposedly relying on any putative 
promise they had made. 
Second, the payment to the architects was not significant enough to support 
consideration for the oral contract CDLF contends was created. As CDLF acknowledges, 
in order for part performance to be used, the performance relied upon must be 
"substantial and valuable." Appellant's Brief at 39. CDLF tries to gloss over this 
requirement by repeatedly pointing to the total amount it spent to improve the Property. 
Id. However, the facts as determined by the lower court clearly reflect that all but 
$13,320 for architectural services was spent after the March 23, 2001 letter was sent. 
Findings of Fact ^ 37-39. (R. 599.) The payment to the architect was less than two 
percent (2%) of the total amount CDLF claims it spent on the Property. This is legally 
insufficient. Cf. Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(contractor failed to establish it "substantially performed" under a contract where 10% of 
the work completed during a three-month period). 
Thus, the lower court properly concluded that "[t]he renovation of the Property, 
then, can easily be viewed as evidencing CDLF's intention to be subject to the offered 
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long-term lease." Conclusions of Law % 12. (R. 603.) See Ewell and Son, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake City, 27 'Utah 2d 188, 193, 493 P.2d 1283, 1286 (1972) (remaining silent in full 
awareness of other parties reliance upon oral modification constitutes acceptance of the 
modified terms). This is especially true where, as here, CDLF contends that after 
receiving the March 23, 2001 letter, "Ms. Thomas made a point of telephoning Mrs. 
Carter about every four to six weeks. These regular contacts continued until the Spring 
of 2002. During this period, Ms. Thomas kept Mrs. Carter informed of the progress of 
the improvements." Appellant's Statement of Facts TJ 31, Appellant's Brief at 15. 
However, she never told Ms. Carter that she had consulted with her counsel and 
determined that CDLF did not accept the terms of the March 23, 2001 letter and intended 
to hold the Carters to their promise to convey the Property to CDLF. Appellant's 
Statement of Facts 135, Appellant's Brief at 17. It is Ms. Thomas' silence, not Ms. 
Carter's, which is inexplicable under the circumstances. 
Finally, the retention and payment of the architect were merely preparatory acts to 
the performance of the alleged contract; not actual performance of the agreement. 
"Acts merely ancillary to an oral agreement for the sale of lands, 
although attended with expense, are not considered acts of part 
performance sufficient to relieve the case from the provisions of the 
statute of frauds." 
Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah 2d 294, 293-94, 495 P.2d 817 (1972) (quoting DeMarco v. 
Estlow, 18 N.J. Super. 30, 86 A.2d 446, 447-448 (1952)). 
CDLF acknowledges that the acts of performance upon which it relies must be 
exclusively referable to the contract. Appellant's Brief at 39'. Implicitly, CDLF 
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recognizes that the evidentiary burden for this showing is on CDLF. The parol evidence 
concerning the Lease Agreement relied upon by CDLF does not meet this burden. In 
light of CDLF's silence following its receipt of the March 23, 2001 letter, the lower 
court's determination that the subsequent expenditures could be viewed as evidencing 
CDLF's intention to be subject to the offered long-term lease are adequately supported by 
the record. Conclusions of Law f 12. (R. 603.) 
CDLF also acknowledges that the improvements to the Property were necessary to 
bring it into compliance with Head Start Program guidelines. Appellant's Brief at 2, 
39-40 and 47; Appellants Statement of Facts fflf 10, 27, Id. at 7 and 14. This fact supports 
the lower court's conclusion that the improvements made by CDLF were covered by the 
Lease Agreement, which allowed CDLF "at its own cost and expense" to "make such 
alteration in the building as [CDLF] may require for the conduct of its business." Lease 
Agreement f 6, Appellant App. Ex. F.14 Conclusions of Law f^ 13. (R. 603.) 
C. CDLF's Claim of Irreparable Harm Has Not Been Adequately 
Established. 
CDLF does not contend that the lower court's legal conclusion that speculative 
assertions of harm are inadequate under the first of the four elements required for a 
preliminary injunction to issue under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(e). Conclusion 
of Law f 23. (R. 606.) Rather, CDLF contends that in the event its Honeyville facility is 
The Lease Agreement attached as Appellant's App. Ex. F. is missing its page 3 in 
the copy served on counsel for the Carters, as were other copies in the record. For the 
convenience of the Court, a complete copy of the Lease Agreement can be found 
attached, in the Appellees' Addendum. 
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closed, CDLF will be unable to administer the Head Start Program that currently serves 
17215 children and some 100 migrant families. Appellant's Brief at 26.16 
CDLF undercuts its own position with respect to the presence of irreparable harm, 
or the lack thereof, with the new evidence it presents in its Appellant's Brief. Since the 
lower court ruled, CDLF closed another Migrant Head Start facility, this one in Garland, 
Utah,17 and successfully relocated 62 children. Appellant's Brief at 20-21 n.4. In 
addition, CDLF has presented this Court with facts which show it is able to open a new 
facility in order to accommodate its displaced clients. Id. 
In addition to supporting the lower court's finding that CDLF's "harm" was 
speculative, the fact that CDLF closed another facility and increased the number of 
children and migrant families dependent upon its program at the Honeyville site is a self-
This figure is based on evidence arising after the lower court issued its ruling and 
presented for the first time in CDLF Appellant's Brief. Appellant's Brief at 20-21 n.3 
and 4. 
CDLF also asserts that the families which it would not be able to serve could not 
obtain comparable child care anywhere else in Utah or Southern Idaho. Appellant's Brief 
at 26 Obviously, this is not a harm to CDLF, but to the families which might be affected. 
CDLF also claims it might "lose credibility with its clients, and in the community" and 
"will also be unable to preserve the substantial improvements it has made to the 
Property." Id. at 26-27. Contrary to CDLF's assertions, both of these types of harm 
could be compensated in money damages. 
The lower court relied upon the fact that CDLF had closed its Migrant Head Start 
center in Provo, Utah and was able to relocate its clients. The Garland center was one of 
only two facilities serving Northern Utah and Southern Idaho at the time the Motion was 
denied. Ruby Anderson Affidavit % 5. (R. 156.) CDLF's Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction was denied in an April 2, 2003 Minute Entry ruling. (R. 550-51.) CDLF 
states that the Garland facility was closed on July 31, 2003. 
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inflicted harm which courts do not deem to be irreparable. See Salt Lake Tribune 
Publishing Co. v. AT&T Corp., 320 F.3d 1081, 1106 (10th Cir. 2003). 
D. Harm to Carters, 
Contrary to CDLF's assertion, the Carters have and will suffer harm if a 
preliminary injunction is granted. The Carters have already incurred costs and attorneys' 
fees trying to maintain the structure and limitations placed on what was intended as a 
gratuitous gift to CDLF. In addition, Dream Chaser is entitled to holdover rent and will, 
therefore, be damaged as the result of any wrongful order or injunction. Finally, Dream 
Chaser, not CDLF, has paid all of the property taxes on the Property. Affidavit of 
Bonita K. Carter f 36. (R. 286.) 
For these reasons, Carters requested in the lower court that in the event CDLF's 
motion were granted, CDLF should be required to post a bond of at least $50,000.00. 
Memorandum in Opposition at 9. (R. 200.) 
CONCLUSION 
Under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the findings of the lower court 
"whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous . . . . " They "clearly erroneous" only if a trial court's findings lack any support 
so as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. The lower court's factual findings 
are adequately supported by the record of this case. 
18
 In addition, in January 2001, the Carters donated $3,000 to CDLF to help CDLF 
pay the utilities at the Honeyville Property. Affidavit of Bonita K. Carter \ 35 (R. 286) 
and Ex. 3. (R. 306-07.) 
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CDLF's failure to marshal the evidence also warrants affirmance of the lower 
court's decision because the findings are presumed correct. In any event, each of the 
lower court's findings was adequately supported. CDLF cannot meet its burden to show 
that the clear weight of the evidence supports a finding that it has met all the elements of 
a preliminary injunction. 
The facts as determined by the lower court demonstrate that the Carters never 
expressed a sufficient intent to be bound by the alleged oral contract to convey title to the 
Property to CDLF. At best, CDLF has presented evidence that there was nothing more 
than an unenforceable agreement to agree. None of these "memorializations" relied upon 
by CDLF satisfy the statute of frauds. 
The evidence of part performance presented here is insufficient to satisfy the 
requirement of consideration needed to find the formation of a contract, and to avoid the 
statute of frauds. The acts of performance are not exclusively referable to the Lease 
Agreement. 
DATED thi day of September, 2003. 
Kevin N. Andersor 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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LEASE AGREEMENT 
THIS LEASE AGREEMENT (the "Lease") is effective this ) > ^ day of 
October, 2000 (the "Effective Date"), between Dream Chaser, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company ("Landlord"), and Centro de la Familia de Utah, a Utah non-profit corporation 
("Tenant"). 
WITNESSETH: 
In consideration of the covenant to maintain the property which is the subject of 
this Lease, to pay taxes and insurance and of the mutual covenants and agreements of the parties 
hereinafter set forth, it is agreed as follows: 
1. Leased Premises. Landlord has and does hereby lease to Tenant, the 
premises described on Exhibit "A", including all appurtenances and improvements located 
thereon, and all of Landlord's rights, if any, in and to the premises described on Exhibit "B" with 
each of said premises being located in Honeyville, Utah (collectively the "Premises") for the 
term and upon the rental, conditions and covenants as the parties herein set forth. Said Premises 
includes improvements thereto. 
2. Term. The term of this Lease shall be two years and shall commence on 
the Effective Date and, unless terminated or extended, shall end on the \^ day of October, 
2002. 
3. Rent. As a charitable contribution by the Landlord, Tenant is not required 
to pay any ($0) rent directly to Landlord. Provided, in the event Tenant holds-over after the 
term of this Lease, or after Landlord validly terminates this lease early, as a result of Tenant's 
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breach, then Tenant shall pay to Landlord for such hold-over period at the rate of Five Thousand 
Dollars ($5,000.00) per month. 
4. Authorized Uses. Tenant shall use the Premises only for lawful purposes. 
Such use shall be subject to restrictions of all applicable state and federal laws, restrictions and 
statutes, as well as local zoning ordinances. 
5. Prohibited Uses. Tenant will not keep, use or sell, or allow to be kept, 
used, sold, deposited or stored in or on the Premises, any article or material which is prohibited 
by law, or which would render any fire or other hazard insurance policies in force with respect to 
the Premises void or voidable. Landlord shall have 60 days after the date hereof to remove any 
such prohibited material that are present as of the date hereof. 
Tenant shall not use the Premises in any manner that will constitute waste, 
nuisance or unreasonable annoyance (including without limitation, the use of loudspeakers or 
sound or light apparatus that can be heard or seen outside the Premises) to occupants of adjacent 
properties. 
Tenant shall not do anything on the Premises that will cause damage to the 
Premises, ordinary wear and tear excepted. 
6. Repair and Care of Building bv Tenant. Tenant has inspected the 
Premises and accepts the Premises AS IS and in the condition it is in at the time of the 
commencement of the term of this Lease. Tenant specifically takes subject to the current sewer 
which may become unusable because of potential loss of use of a portion of the Premises. Tenant 
will not commit any waste of the Premise, nor shall it use or permit the use of the Premise in 
violation of any present or future law of the United States or of the State of Utah, or in violation 
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of any municipal ordinance or regulation applicable thereto. Tenant may at its own cost and 
expense? and in a good and workmanlike manner, make such alterations in the building as Tenant 
may require for the conduct of its business without, however, materially altering the basic 
character of the building or improvements or weakening any structure on the Premises. Tenant 
agrees to keep the interior of the building and the improvements on the Premises, including those 
outside the building and the parking lot and grounds and yard surfacing in good condition and 
repair, including repairs to the electrical wiring, heating, air conditioning, plumbing systems, and 
parking paving and to clean and paint the interior of the Premises as the same may or might be 
necessary in order to maintain said Premises in a clean, attractive ,and sanitary condition. Tenant 
shall keep any walkways, parking area and driveways reasonably free from ice and snow. Any 
alterations or improvements to the Premises shall become the property of the Landlord at the 
expiration or sooner termination of this Lease, except as herein otherwise provided. 
Tenant may use any licensed, reputable contractor in the remodeling, repair or 
maintenance of the Premises or the building thereon, with the expense of such contractor's work 
to be paid by Tenant. Additionally, in the event of an emergency, Tenant may employ the 
services of any reputable contractor to perform emergency corrective actions. 
Tenant agrees to maintain the roof of the building and the building's structure in 
good condition and repair. 
7. Erection and Removal of Signs. During the term of the lease, Tenant may 
replace or add signage to the Premises for the purpose of indicating the nature of the business 
carried on by the Tenant on said Premises; provided, however, that such additional signage shall 
be in conformity with all laws and ordinances in the district where the Premises are located. 
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Damage to the Premises caused by the installation or removal of such signs shall be repaired and 
paid for by Tenant. 
8. Glass. Tenant agrees to replace all glass broken or damaged during the 
term of this Lease, with glass of the same quality as that broken or damaged. 
9. Payment of Utilities. Tenant shall pay all charges for water, heat, gas, 
sewer, electricity, telephone and all other utilities or services used on the Premises, including 
deposits. 
10. Payment of Taxes and Other Assessments. Tenant shall use its best efforts 
to obtain an exception from the payment of property taxes based upon Tenant's charitable use of 
the property. To the extent Tenant is unsuccessful in obtain such exemption, Tenant shall timely 
pay the general real property taxes, as well as all other taxes, license fees and charges incidental 
to the conduct of Tenant's business on the Premises during the term of this Lease, including 
taxes on Tenant's personal property situated on the Premises; provided, however, that Tenant 
may contest or dispute any such tax, or the amount thereof, upon providing sufficient surety for 
the payment thereof. Landlord shall timely provide Tenant with all notices of the general real 
property tax on the Premises. Upon request by Landlord, Tenant shall give Landlord proof of 
exemption or of payment of such taxes prior to the due date for payment. Taxes for the first 
calendar year of the term of this Lease shall be prorated between the parties as of the date Tenant 
obtains possession of the Premises and taxes for the last year shall be prorated to and including 
the date Tenant quits possession of the Premises. Tenant shall pay all assessments (building 
permits) required as a result of its improvements to the Premises. Special assessments imposed 
by any governmental agency as a result of governmentally required improvements that enhance, 
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or purport to enhance, the value of the Premises shall be paid between Landlord and Tenant on 
such terms as they may then mutually agree after considering the remaining period of Tenant's 
Lease and the useful life of the improvement in question. The reasonable, useful life, for 
example, of curb and gutter shall be twenty (20) years. 
11. Right of Entry by Landlord. Landlord and its authorized agents or 
representatives shall have the right to enter the Premises at all reasonable times during regular 
business hours for any of the following purposes: 
(a) To determine whether the Premises are in good condition and whether 
Tenant is complying with its obligations under this Lease; 
(b) To perform, after reasonable notice to Tenant (unless an emergency, in 
which case no notice shall be required), any necessary maintenance including janitorial 
services and to make any restoration to the Premises or the building and other 
improvements in which the Premises are located that Landlord has the right to perform; 
(c) To serve, post, or keep posted any notices required or allowed under 
the provisions of this Lease; 
(d) To post "for rent" or "for lease" signs during the last sixty (60) days of 
the final non renewed term of this Lease, or during any period while Tenant is in default; 
and 
(e) To show, after reasonable notice to Tenant, the Premise to prospective 
brokers, agents, buyers, tenants, or persons with bona-fide interest in an exchange or 
purchase of the Premise, at any time during the term of this Lease or any extension 
thereof. 
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Landlord shall not be liable in any manner for any inconvenience, disturbance, 
loss of business, nuisance, or other damage arising out of Landlord's entry on the Premises as 
provided in this Paragraph (or any persons brought or permitted onto the Premises by Landlord 
or its agents). The above to the contrary notwithstanding, Landlord shall conduct itself during 
such inspections in a reasonable businesslike manner and shall be liable for physical injury or 
damage resulting from the negligence or acts or omissions of Landlord or its authorized 
representatives. Absent an emergency, Landlord shall give forty-eight (48) hours prior notice of 
its entry on the Premises, which notice shall be deemed "reasonable" hereunder. 
12. Assignment and Subletting. Neither this Lease nor any interest herein 
may be assigned by the Tenant voluntarily or involuntarily by operation of law, and neither all 
nor any part of the Premises shall be sublet by the Tenant for a period of longer than 30 days 
without the prior written consent of the Landlord. Landlord may withhold its consent on any 
basis it, may from time to time, determine. In the event Landlord withhold's consent to sublet 
the Premises, Landlord shall be obligated to immediately terminate the Lease with Tenant 
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. Any such assignment or sublease without Landlord's 
prior permission shall be void and unenforceable and shall constitute a default under this Lease. 
13. Damage, Destruction or Condemnation. Should the Premises (or any 
portions thereof) be damaged or destroyed, Landlord shall, within fifteen (15) days from the date 
of such damage or destruction, either (i) notify Tenant in writing of Landlord's election to repair 
such damage or destruction, in which event Landlord shall promptly repair the same; or (ii) 
notify Tenant in writing of Landlord's election to immediately terminate this Lease, in which 
event this Lease shall be so terminated effective as of the date of such damage or destruction. 
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In the event notice of condemnation by any governmental authority of the 
Premises or such part thereof as shall substantially impair the ability of Tenant to conduct its 
business, this Lease and the obligations of the parties hereto shall terminate as of the date of 
occupancy by such governmental authority. All proceeds and awards of condemnation, whether 
received pursuant to agreement between Landlord and any governmental agency or judgment of 
any court, shall be exclusively paid to and owned by Landlord, who shall have the sole right to 
negotiate and conclude a settlement of the condemnation award or to litigate such award, in 
Landlord's sole discretion. 
14. Injuries and Property Damage. Tenant agrees to indemnify and hold 
harmless the Landlord from any and all claims of any kind or nature arising from the Tenant's 
use of the Premises during the term hereof, and Tenant hereby waives all claims against the 
Landlord for damages to goods, wares or merchandise or for injury to persons in and upon the 
Premises from any cause whatsoever, except such as might result from the negligence of the 
Landlord to perform its obligations hereunder within a reasonable time after notice in writing by 
the Tenant requiring such performance by the Landlord. 
Tenant agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Landlord from any and all 
claims of any kind or nature arising from (i) any use or occupancy of the Premises, by the Tenant 
or an approved sublessee after the Effective Date, (ii) Tenant's performance or failure to perform 
as herein provided, (iii) any negligence of Tenant, or any of its agents, contractors, employees, 
invitees or licensees, and (iv) for all claims arising from violations of environmental and 
hazardous waste statutes (federal, state and local) predicated upon contamination occurring after 
the Effective Date and as a result of Tenant's use or misuse of the Premises. 
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15. Comprehensive Public Liability Insurance. Tenant shall at all times 
during the term hereof keep in effect with a reputable insurance company qualified to do business 
in the state in which the Premises is located, comprehensive public liability insurance in the 
names oi and for the benefit of the Tenant and Landlord, as their interests appear, with limits not 
less than: 
Bodily Injury $ 500,000 per person 
$1,000,000 per occurrence 
Property Damage $ 1,000,000 per occurrence 
Such overall insurance may, at Tenant's election, be carried under any general blanket coverage 
of Tenant. A renewal policy shall be procured not less than ten (10) days prior to the expiration 
of any policy. Each original policy or a certified copy thereof, or a satisfactory certificate of the 
insurer evidencing insurance carried with proof of payment of premium, shall be deposited with 
Landlord within a reasonable time of Landlord's request. 
16. Fire Insurance. Tenant will cause to be maintained fire insurance on the 
Premises in an amount not less than eighty percent (80%) of the then insurable value, which 
insurance shall name Landlord as primary insured. Tenant shall pay all premiums on such fire 
insurance on a yearly basis. All such policies shall, to the extent obtainable, provide that any 
loss shall be payable to the Landlord or to the holder of any mortgage, as their respective 
interests may appear, notwithstanding any act or negligence of the Tenant which might otherwise 
result in forfeiture of such insurance. Tenant shall annually give Landlord proof of such 
insurance policy being in place, and the policy shall provide that Landlord shall be given at least 
thirty (30) days prior notice of termination. 
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17. Surrender of Premise. Tenant agrees to immediately surrender up the 
Premise and all of Tenant's improvements and alterations, at the expiration, or sooner 
termination, of this Lease, or any extension thereof, in the same condition, or as altered pursuant 
to the provisions of this Lease, ordinary wear, tear and damage by the elements excepted. Prior 
to such termination, Tenant shall remove all signage installed by Tenant, and repair all damages 
caused or incurred as a result of such removal. 
18. Quiet Enjoyment. If Tenant performs and observes all the covenants and 
provisions hereof, the Tenant shall quietly enjoy the Premises, subject, however, to whatever 
rights Landlord has, if any, in that portion of the Premises described on Exhibit "B", hereto 
19. Waiver of Covenants or Conditions. No delay or omission in the exercise 
of any right or remedy of Landlord on any default by Tenant shall impair such a right or remedy 
or be construed as a waiver. No act or conduct of Landlord, including, without limitation, the 
acceptance of the keys to the Premises, shall constitute an acceptance of the surrender of the 
Premises by Tenant before the expiration of the term. Only a notice from Landlord to Tenant 
shall constitute acceptance of the surrender of the Premises and accomplish a termination of the 
Lease. Landlord's consent to or approval of any act by Tenant requiring Landlord's consent or 
approval shall not be deemed to waive or render unnecessary Landlord's consent to or approval 
of any subsequent act by Tenant. Any waiver by Landlord of any default must be in writing and 
shall not be a waiver of any default concerning the same or any other provision of the Lease. 
20. Default. If Tenant shall default in the fulfillment of any of the covenants 
and conditions hereof, Landlord may, at its option, after fifteen (15) days' prior written notice to 
Tenant, make performance for Tenant and for that purpose advance such amounts as may be 
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necessary. Any amounts so advanced or any expense incurred or sum of money paid by 
Landlord by reason of the failure of Tenant to comply with any covenant, agreement, obligation 
or provisions of this Lease or in defending any action to which Landlord may be subject by 
reason of any such failure or any reason of this Lease, shall be deemed to be additional rent for 
the Premises and shall be due and payable to Landlord on demand. The receipt by Landlord of 
any installment of fixed rent or of any additional rent hereunder shall not be a waiver of any 
other rent then due. 
If Tenant shall (i) default in fulfillment of any of the covenants or conditions of 
this Lease or (ii) commit a material breach of any other lease or agreement between Landlord 
and/or Tenant (other than the covenants for the payment of rent or other amounts) and any such 
default shall continue for a period of thirty (30) days after notice, then Landlord may, at its 
option, terminate this Lease by giving Tenant notice of such termination and, thereupon, this 
Lease shall expire as fully and completely as if that day were the date definitely fixed for the 
expiration of the term of this Lease and Tenant shall immediately quit and surrender the 
Premises. If such default cannot be remedied within the period of thirty (30) days by use of 
reasonable diligence, then such additional time shall be granted as may be necessary, provided 
Tenant takes immediate action on receipt of the notice and proceeds diligently to remedy the 
default. 
21. Default in Rent, Cross Default Insolvency of Tenant. If Tenant shall: (i) 
abandon or vacate the Premises or any part thereof; (ii) admit in writing its inability to pay its 
obligations generally as they become due; or (iii) if the leasehold estate created hereby shall be 
taken on execution or by any process of law and not abated, discharged or redeemed by Tenant 
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within sixty (60) days; then Landlord may continue this Lease in effect by not terminating 
Tenant's right of possession of the Premises, and thereby be entitled to enforce all Landlord's 
rights and remedies under this Lease, including the right to recover the rent specified in this 
Lease as it becomes due under this Lease; or terminate Tenant's right to possession of the 
Premises, thereby terminating this Lease, and bring an action to recover and regain possession of 
the Premises in the manner provided by the laws of unlawful detainer then in effect in the state in 
which the Premises are located, and recover as damages from Tenant any amount necessary to 
compensate Landlord for all damages proximately caused by Tenant's failure to perform its 
obligations under this Lease. Landlord shall, in the event it is appropriate, make a commercially 
reasonable effort to mitigate Tenant's damages by reletting the Premises on behalf of Tenant. 
22. Holding Over. Tenant shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless 
Landlord from and against all claims, liabilities and expenses, including attorneys' fees, resulting 
from delay by Tenant in surrendering the Premises in accordance with the provisions of this 
Lease. If Tenant remains in possession of the Premises or any part of the Premises after the early 
expiration of the Term or sooner termination of this Lease with the consent of Landlord (which 
shall be presumed if Tenant remains in possession and Landlord does not notify Tenant in 
writing to quit the Premise within fifteen (15) days following expiration of the Term), absent 
some other written agreement between the parties, such occupancy shall be a tenancy from 
month to month (terminable by either party upon fifteen (15) days prior written notice) at a rental 
in the amount provided above, plus all other charges payable under this Lease, and on all of the 
terms of this Lease applicable to a month to month tenancy. If Tenant remains in possession of 
the Premise or any part of the Premise after the expiration of the Term or sooner termination of 
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this Lease, without the consent of the Landlord, Landlord shall, in addition to any other remedies 
available to it, haveall of the rights and remedies set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-36-1, 
et seq. 
23. Time. Time is of the essence of this Lease and every term, covenant and 
condition herein contained. 
24. Liens. Tenant agrees not to permit any lien for moneys owing by Tenant 
to remain against the Premises for a period of more than thirty (30) days upon actual notice of the 
existence of such lien. Should any such lien be filed and not released or discharged within that 
time, unless Tenant shall contest the same and provide sufficient surety for the payment thereof, 
the same shall constitute a default under the Lease and Landlord may, at Landlord's option (but 
without any obligation to do so), pay or discharge such lien and may likewise pay and discharge 
any taxes, assessments or other charges against the Premises which Tenant is obligated hereunder 
to pay and which may or might become a lien on said Premises. Tenant agrees to repay any such 
sums so paid by the Landlord upon demand therefor, together with interest at the rate of eighteen 
percent (18%) per annum from the date any such payment is made. 
25. No Partnership. Landlord does not by this Lease, in any way or for any 
purpose, become a partner or joint venturer of Tenant in the conduct of Tenant's business or 
otherwise. 
26. Attorneys' Fees. In the event either party shall enforce the terms of this 
Lease by suit or otherwise, whether or not suit is instituted, the prevailing party shall receive its 
costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
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27. Severability. If any provision of this Lease or the application of any 
provision of this Lease to any person or circumstance shall to any extent be invalid, the 
remainder of this Lease or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other 
than those as to which such provision is held invalid shall not be affected by such invalidity. 
Each provision of this Lease shall be valid and enforceable to the fullest exteirt permitted by law. 
28. No Brokerage Commissions. Landlord and Tenant represent and warrant 
that no claims exist against them for any brokerage commissions or finder's fees in connection 
with this Lease and agree to indemnify, defend and hold the other harmless from and against all 
claims, liabilities and expenses, including attorneys' fees, arising from any such brokerage 
commissions or finder's fees. Landlord warrants that Landlord has not dealt with any broker in 
connection with this Lease. 
29. Rights and Remedies. The rights and remedies of Landlord and Tenant 
shall not be mutually exclusive and the exercise of one or mote of the provisions of this Lease 
shall not preclude the exercise of any other provisions. The parties confirm that damages at law 
may be an inadequate remedy for a breach or threatened breach by any party of any of the 
provisions of this Lease. The parties' respective rights and obligations under this Lease shall be 
enforceable by specific performance, injunction or any other equitable remedy. 
30. Notices. Any notice required or permitted to be given hereunder shall be 
deemed sufficient, if given by a communication in writing, by United States mail, postage 
prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
If to the Landlord at the last known address: 
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Ms. Bonita Carter 
29 Lone Hollow Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
If to Tenant at the address of the Premises and 
Ms. Graciela Italiano-Thomas 
Centra de la Familia de Utah 
320 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
With a copy to: 
Mr. Scott W. Hansen 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
50 South Main Street, Seventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
33. Rights of Successors and Assigns. The covenants and agreements 
contained in this Lease shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon the parties 
hereto and upon their respective successors in interest, assigns and legal representatives, except 
as expressly otherwise provided heretofore. 
34. Miscellaneous. The captions to the Paragraphs of this Lease are for 
convenience of reference only and shall not be deemed relevant in resolving questions of 
construction or interpretation under this Lease. Tenant shall aet be allowed to record a 
memorandum or notice of this Lease without the prior written consent of Landlord. Each 
provision to be performed by Tenant shall be construed to be both a covenant and a condition. 
This Lease shall be governed by and construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the 
State of Utah. This Agreement replaces all prior agreements of the parties hereto as to the rental 
of the Premises by Tenant. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto caused these presents to be executed 
the day and year first above written. 
LANDLORD: 
Dream Chaser, LLC 
Its Manager 
TENANT: 
Centro de la Familia de Utah 
• v 
By: Gradelaltaliano-Thomas 
Its: Chief Executive Officer 
327191 
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